"Los nadies y las nadies": The effect of peace-building on political behavior in Colombia*

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March 16, 2023

Abstract

How has peace-building affected political behavior in Colombia? This paper studies the historic victory for the Colombian Left in the 2022 Presidential Elections in light of two different but complementary factors: historical violence and the institutional design and implementation of local peace-building programs through the 2016 peace accords. Using a quasi-experimental design, we show that the local implementation of the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (PDET), a central component of the 2016 Peace Accords between the government and the FARC, increased the vote share for the leftist Pacto Historico in the 2022 elections by increasing voter turnout in PDET regions. In a departure from existing literature, we find that the explanatory effect of violence on vote share is significantly reduced when we include an indicator for PDET implementation and additional covariates. While there is a substantial body of work examining the effects of conflict violence and the presence of armed actors on Colombian elections, there has been relatively little focus on how the ongoing peace process has affected vote choice and political behavior. We see our project as a bridge to fill this gap in the literature.

*We thank Isabella Alcañiz, Juan Angulo, Leo Bauer, Ernesto Calvo, and the rest of the attendees of the Comparative Politics Workshop at the University of Maryland for their valuable comments. This research was funded by the Rapoport Family Foundation and its *Summer Research Collaborative Award* program. Declarations of interest: None.

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1 Introduction

"Los nadies: los hijos de nadie, los dueños de nada. Los nadies: los ningunos, los ninguneados, corriendo la liebre, muriendo la vida, jodidos, rejodidos: que no son, aunque sean(...)"
(Galeano, 1989).

On June 19, 2022, Gustavo Petro, a leftist politician and former guerrilla member, and Francia Márquez, an environmental activist and Black feminist social leader, won the Colombian presidential election. Their victory was historic and has received global attention due to Colombia's long history of political conservatism, enduring political violence, and structural racism. Vice-President Márquez claimed the electoral result as a victory for the "nadies" (nobodies) that have been ravaged by the conflict and decades of state neglect.

This paper studies the victory for the Colombian Left in light of two different but complementary factors: historical violence and the institutional design and implementation of local peace-building programs through the 2016 peace accords. Several studies over the past decade have demonstrated that civil conflict violence has affected voting behavior. Armed actors have used violence to coerce votes and this pattern has typically favored politicians and parties on the right (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Gutiérrez Sanín and Vargas Reina, 2016; Bandiera, 2021). Intense episodes of conflict violence in peripheral regions of the country have tipped some elections in favor of hawkish politicians—especially where voters are further away from violence (Weintraub et al., 2015). In contrast, localities that experience more intense violence have tended to vote more strongly for peace (Branton et al., 2019; Dávalos et al., 2018).

Political violence remains stubbornly relevant in Colombia (Arjona, 2016a; Gallego, 2018). But Colombia has also made important strides toward peace-building. In late November of 2016, the Colombian Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace agreement to end the longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere.[1] The existing literature has focused lots of attention on the relationship between violence and voting (Taylor, 2009; Gillooly, 2022). Yet, we know relatively little about how peace-building fits within this story. How has peace-building affected political behavior in Colombia? In particular, what were the impacts of peace-building institutions on political participation and the Petro-Márquez

[1] According to the Unidad-Victimas (2022), more than 1 million people were killed in the conflict and over 9 million people have been registered as victims. As of October 2021, the Colombian government had made progress toward implementing more than 85% of stipulations within the 2016 Peace Accords (Alvarez et al., 2022).

vote in 2022? To address this important gap in the literature, we focus on one of the most encompassing peace-building institutions in the 2016 Peace Accords, the Development Plans with a Territorial Focus (Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial—hereinafter PDET) in the context of the 2022 national election. PDET is a bottom-up policy designed to provide public goods and services. In the words of the peace deal, its objective is "to achieve the structural transformation of the countryside and the rural environment and to promote an equitable relationship between rural and urban areas"(Gobierno-Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016). The program design prioritized the municipalities with high levels of unsatisfied basic needs, presence of coca crops, historical conflict, and low administrative and management capabilities. There are 170 municipalities in the program, covering 36% of the Colombian territory and including 6,6 million people (Gobierno-Colombia, 2022) (see map 1).

We argue that peace-building institutions played an important role in driving both vote choice and electoral turnout in the 2022 elections in the shadow of historical and ongoing patterns of conflict violence. PDET created a set of new institutions at the local level that guarantee civic participation in local-level decision making (Velazquez and Londoño, 2022; Shenk, 2022). These forums bring together actors that have been historically marginalized by the conflict, such as community organizations and former FARC members, and a series of state actors, like national government representatives, the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of the Attorney General, the Office of the Comptroller General, and the Office of the Ombudsman (Gobierno-Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016). Building on existing scholarship that shows that higher levels of voter turnout boosts electoral support for parties and candidates on the left (Martins and Veiga, 2014; Held, 2023), we argue that PDET communities—communities that by definition have experienced the most acute impacts of civil conflict violence—should have been more likely to support Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez, relative to non-PDET communities. And we explain this relative boon for the left, based on PDET's expected effects on voter-turnout.

We use municipal data from multiple rounds of the 2022 Colombian presidential election, in addition to municipal data on conflict violence and PDET implementation to test the marginal and interactive relationship between violence and peace-building and the vote share for Petro and Márquez. We also simulate a quasi-experimental design through nearest-neighbor propensity score matching to estimate the effect of peace-building programs on left-wing and pro-peace candidates. As a further mechanism test, we also use the propensity scores to simulate a

differences-in-differences design to measure the effect of PDET on voter turnout.

Our results are twofold. First, we find that in the 2022 presidential elections, higher levels of historical violence were a weak predictor of support for the Petro-Márquez coalition. This finding is consistent with several recent studies on the electoral effects of violence in the Colombian context that have found support for the peace deal and greater opposition to hard-liner candidates in communities with higher levels of conflict violence (Branton et al., 2019; Gillooly, 2022; Liendo and Braithwaite, 2018). Second, we identify a larger effect of PDET on vote choice and turnout. Local PDET implementation increased Petro's vote share by 1.7 and 3.4 percentage points controlling for the previous election. Although we cannot make too strong a generalization from the analysis of one election, our evidence suggests that the effect of guerrilla attacks is moderated by local PDET implementation. Moreover, PDET municipalities have a significant higher turnout rate relative to matched municipalities. Thus, PDET implementation may have reduced the salience of historical violence in the most affected communities in 2022 and addressed some of the structural limitations to voter turnout under the threat of violence (Ley, 2018; Albarracín et al., 2022).

This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, an overview of the 2022 Presidential election and the qualification of two anti-establishment candidates for the run-off is presented. The difficulties faced in the implementation of the Development Plan with a Territorial Focus and its impact on community participation and representation are explored in Section 3. The relevant literature regarding violence, peace implementation, and voting is reviewed and hypotheses are formulated in Section 4. The data employed and the empirical strategies utilized are described in Section 5. The results of our regression analysis and quasi-experimental investigation are presented in Section 6. Finally, the study concludes in Section 7.

2 The 2022 Presidential Election

In the two decades prior to the 2022 presidential elections in Colombia, *Uribismo*—the hard-line militaristic approach to the pacification of Colombia's left-wing insurgency—was a powerful force in the electoral arena (Gamboa Gutiérrez, 2019). The 2022 elections marked a substantial departure from the status-quo. First, the election has been framed as a rejection of traditional political parties and Alvaro Uribe's hardliner approach to violence and insecurity (Long et al., 2022a). Colombians also voiced their dissatisfaction with the outgoing Duque government during

the "*Paro Nacional* (National Strike)" in 2021 and disatisfaction continued to mount in response to the unequal economic burden of the governments' policies to prevent the spread of Covid-19 (ECLAC, 2022). Uribe's party, *Centro Democrático*, lost congressional seats in the March legislative elections and failed to field a candidate in the May first-round presidential elections. Moreover, Federico Gutiérrez, the candidate of a coalition of right-wing political parties, *Equipo por Colombia*, was expected to take second-place (Semana, 2022). Gutiérrez came in third place (23.94 percent), and a relatively unknown candidate, Rodolfo Hernández (28.17 percent), managed to qualify for the second round. The strong performance of Francia Márquez in the primary elections and her historic vice-presidential run mobilized decades of voter frustration and used Colombian culutre and art, along with specific appeals to Black and indigenous identity, making visible the voices and preferences of communities that had been silenced throughout Colombia's history (Ramírez-Botero, 2022). Gustavo Petro won a historic victory in the second-round run-off against Hernández, winning 50.4% of the vote to Hernández's 47.3%. In his historic victory speech, Petro assured that the demands of the "National Strike," as well as the Havana Peace Agreement, would be implemented during his government (CNN, 2022).

In-line with this anti-establishment view of the 2022 elections, another important factor explaining the shift in the electorate was the strong turnout by members of marginalized black, indigenous and peasant communities. The continued wave of violence in the Colombian periphery since the 2016 Peace Deal was expected to propose a real threat to turnout and electoral competition, especially in the PDET municipalities (Colombia+20, 2022; Nygård et al., 2020). Voter turnout increased to 58% in the June second-round presidential elections, up 13 percentage points from the 2006 presidential elections in which Uribe was re-elected. The high levels of participation by the most marginalized sectors of the Colombian electorate provided an important counter-weight to the strong conservative bastion in the Andean region. As López (2022) explains, "Abstention decreased precisely in the territories where Petro and Márquez have the most influence: on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts [, the Amazon,] and in big cities." To further understand the surprising results of the election, we turn our focus to PDET communities where historically marginalized voters provided critical electoral support to the Pacto Historico.

3 Development Plan with a Territorial Focus (PDET)

In late November 2016, the National Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC) signed a peace agreement to end the longest-running conflict in the Western Hemisphere that left more than one million of people dead and around nine million total victims (Unidad-Victimas, 2022). Since then, the government has overseen the roll-out of several different programs designed to stabilize institutions and improve living conditions in the communities that have been most directly affected by the violence. The implementation of the different chapters of the peace agreement has been characterized by heterogeneous advances (Rettberg, 2020; Angarita and Gelvez, 2022). At of the time of our writing, nearly 30% of the 578 stipulations in the peace accords have been completed (Kroc, 2023). Out of these 578 stipulations, 130 focus on issues and rights related to gender and 80 on issues and rights related to ethnic groups, but only 11.54% and 12.5% of these stipulations have been completed. In our analysis we focus on one of the most encompassing peace-building programs, the Development Programmes with a Territorial-Based Focus (Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial - PDET). Relative to the overall agreement, the government has made substantial progress on completing the PDET program (50% of PDET stipulations have been implemented at the time of this writing).[2]

PDET is a bottom-up policy designed to provide public goods and services. In the words of the Peace Agreement, its objective is "to achieve the structural transformation of the countryside and the rural environment and to promote an equitable relationship between rural and urban areas"(Gobierno-Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016). PDET Zones were created in areas that met four characteristics: 1) high exposure to conflict, 2) coca cultivation, 3) low state capacity, and 4) high levels of poverty (unsatisfied basic needs).[3] There are 170 municipalities in the program, covering 36% of the Colombian territory and including 6.6 million people, as shown in Fig. 1 (Gobierno-Colombia, 2022).

[2]In addition to PDET, there are 2 other important programs that the Peace Deal designed to address the consequences of the conflict in the most marginalized geographies. The National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos, or NCPS); and temporary "peace" seats in Colombia's House of Representatives. Because the three programs overlap in their scope, the peace accord established that the actions of the NCPS and the constituency of the 16 ''peace seats" should be promoted within the PDET program (Gobierno-Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016). As a result, the remainder of this discussion and our analysis focuses on the PDET.

[3]See Tab. A5 and Tab. A6 for evidence that PDET and non-PDET municipalities significantly differ along this selection criteria.

Figure 1 PDET location.



The Comprehensive Rural Reform Program, of which PDET is a part, aims to "contribute to the reversal of the effects of the conflict and to change the conditions that have facilitated the persistence of violence" in these historically affected zones of the country (Gobierno-Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016). Evidence from two survey waves (2019 and 2021) of 12,000 Colombians living in the 16 PDET areas finds that perceptions of overall security in PDET municipalities are quite low and have gotten worse over time (Nygård et al., 2020). In 2021, respondents in 13 of the 16 of PDET municipalities perceived that their security situation had gotten worse since 2019; 35% of respondents reported that the conflict continued in their municipality, in comparison to 17% in 2019. While guerrilla violence in PDET municipalities has decreased steadily over the last few years, the rate of targeted assassinations of social leaders have increased by 481% since the implementation of the Peace Accords began, the majority of these killings (over 1,000) have occurred within PDET zones and have disproportionately impacted women social leaders (Llanes, 2022; MOE, 2018).

The absence of the state in Colombia's peripheral regions is an often used explanation for cycles of poverty, violence, corruption, and institutional weakness (Holmes and Amin, 2014). According to Escobar Arango (2017), PDET proposes a solution to the "endemic problem" of

centralized decision-making by the national government for peripheral regions to the exclusion of local community members. PDET, in contrast, provides a bottom up approach to territorial reform, where problems are identified and solutions are developed by community members themselves, first at the smallest administrative unit (*la vereda*), then at the municipal level, and finally integrated into a regional action plan. Each stage, incorporates the input and perspectives of community members that the conflict has historically marginalized. According to official statistics collected by Ramírez Sarmiento (2021), between 2018 and 2020, nearly 1300 PDET projects were completed through this community consultation process, leading to a projected $4.1 billion (Colombian Pesos) of inversions in PDET communities.

In sum, the communities that have been most affected by the civil conflict historically, have been specifically targeted with a bundle of policies designed to improve their living conditions by expanding the terms of community participation and representation in collective decision-making. As a result, we consider the electoral implications for expanding the terms of political participation in these historically marginalized areas.

4 The effects of violence and peace-building on voting

The effects of five decades of civil conflict have presented important challenges to Colombian electoral democracy. Episodes of targeted political violence have traditionally excluded leftist actors and former combatants from full political participation and representation (Fergusson et al., 2021; Steele, 2011). Armed actors use territorial control and quid-pro-quo relationships with politicians to directly influence election outcomes (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Alvaro Uribe's election to the presidency in 2002 and again in 2006 and his election to the Senate in 2014, gave substantial political clout to the hawkish position against the FARC and a negotiated end to the decades-old conflict. In comparison, all candidates took a pro-peace position in the 2022 elections, signaling a shift in the directional impacts of violence (Llorente, 2022).

The relationship between civil conflict violence and voter preferences in comparative politics is a fickle one. Global studies of civil conflict violence and terrorism show that exposure to violence may make voters less supportive of making concessions to the groups that they deem responsible for violence. Terrorist attacks and conflict violence (or even the threat of violence) can push voters to the right, toward hawkish candidates and parties (Arce, 2003; Berrebi and Klor, 2006; Kibris, 2011). In contrast, other studies find the opposite effect (even within the

same country-context). Exposure to political violence may make voters more supportive of concessions to armed groups as a means to prevent further violence (Gould and Klor, 2010; Pape, 2003). The conflicting results in these studies underline the importance of considering the political context in which violence occurs and the variable valence and framing of political violence (Gassebner et al., 2008; Montalvo, 2011).

One consistent finding from this literature is that voters' proximity to violence tends to condition the strength and direction of the effect of violence on their voting behavior. Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) find that voters in Israeli localities that are within range of Palestinian rockets, and thus perceive a greater threat of violence, vote for right-wing parties at higher rates. Birnir and Gohdes (2018), in the Peruvian context, argue that the electoral effects of violence are localized. Attacks by *Sendero Luminoso* in the years prior to the 1990 presidential election generated significant negative electoral costs for *Izquierda Unida* (IU), the left-wing party associated with *Sendero Luminoso*, but only in the provinces where a high number of attacks occurred. Outside of the most violence-affected provinces, the IU maintained its traditional level of support and even gained votes in the 1990 election.[4]

Proximity to violence, typically measured by the intensity of civil conflict violence at the municipal level, continues to be an important factor to understanding voting behavior in Colombia. Weintraub et al. (2015)'s analysis of the 2014 election shows that President Juan Manuel Santos performed better in municipalities that experienced moderate levels of attacks by the FARC in the years prior to the election compared to municipalities that experienced very low and very high levels of violence. They explain this inverse-U relationship by arguing that voters that experience high levels of violence were likely unconvinced of the efficacy of Santos' peace-talks with the FARC, and thus more open to Zuluaga's hardline stance against negotiations. Relatedly, Garcia Sanchez (2016) traces patterns of paramilitary violence at the municipal level and finds that voters were more likely to support the incumbent Uribe government in 2006 in municipalities where paramilitaries had consolidated their power with violence.[5]

[4]It is also important to note that greater exposure to Sendero Luminoso violence did not affect the vote share of all parties on the left generally, but specifically the IU—the leftist party that was closely associated with the the insurgency. This is an important point to consider, in light of the strong pattern of center-left and left support in violence affected areas in Colombia.

[5]Note that this takes a slightly different take on the relationship between violence and vote choice. Rather than voter's expressing their true preferences, Garcia Sanchez (2016)'s argument, and others like it, assume a coercive, clientelistic relationship where paramilitaries intimidate voters into supporting certain candidates (Arjona, 2016a; Acemoglu et al., 2013).

Yet, the broader political context matters. As Colombian voters, especially voters in the most affected areas, continued to grow weary of the violence, many grew more supportive of peace talks generally and the final peace agreement (Branton et al., 2019). While Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz (2018) found that the process of negotiations tended to be more popular among Colombian voters than the actual detailed policies within the agreement and that FARC endorsements lowered public support for the agreement overall, Tellez (2019) finds that this is conditional on proximity to violence. Voters living in conflict zones were more willing to make concessions to armed actors, if this meant an end to the conflict (Arjona, 2016b; Branton et al., 2019).

The 2022 Presidential elections in Colombia were the first elections in a few decades for which the civil conflict was not the key position issue dividing the leading candidates. All of the leading presidential candidates and coalitions took a general stance in favor of continuing the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement, although Gustavo Petro's appeals to provide a ''social pardon"—a path to reconciliation that would broadly pardon the perpetrators of civil conflict violence—went the furthest in this direction (Long et al., 2022b). The trend of relatively low FARC violence in the years leading up to the 2022 election likely rule out the possibility that voters in the areas hardest hit by violence would hold Gustavo Petro accountable for his historical association with left-wing guerrillas (Birnir and Gohdes, 2018) or that FARC violence would boost support for the right-wing coalition rally-around-the-flag effect for the right-wing incumbent (Bonanno and Jost, 2006; Falcó-Gimeno et al., 2022).[6] Based on the evidence of the highly context-specific effects of violence on voting behavior in the voting and violence literature and the fairly strong and consistent finding in recent Colombian elections linking violence to an anti-hardliner stance, we expect that greater experiences of violence will predict stronger support for the leftist (more pro-peace) coalition in the first and second rounds of the 2022 presidential election.

$Hypothesis_1$: Municipalities that experience more civil conflict violence will be more likely to vote in favor of the leftist coalition candidate.

[6]The "rally around the flag effect" occurs because highly salient attacks encourage consensus and cooperation across party lines in support of the incumbent government. This relationship is bounded temporally. Incumbents are more often punished for attacks that occur further away from the election (Falcó-Gimeno et al., 2022). Moreover, the Centro Democrático did not join the right wing coalition Equípo por Colombia, which means that voters would not be able to directly translate their support for Centro Democrático into votes in the first and second rounds of the presidential elections, which we analyze in this paper.

PDET communities have experienced the brunt of civil conflict violence in recent decades and our review of the literature so far gives us some expectations for how and why violence would be a salient factor in the 2022 elections. How does the PDET program fit into this picture? Have peace-building institutions reduced violence? Preliminary evidence for the latter question is mixed. On the one hand, a 2019 study by *Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support* project in Colombia (MAPS) found that approximately 30% of respondents surveyed in PDET areas said that an armed group(s) controlled their community. In comparison, 55% of respondents in PDET areas reported that at least one armed group controlled their community prior to the Peace Agreement. There is also wide variation across PDET areas, 40% or more of people surveyed reported the continued presence and governance of armed actors in their communities in more than a quarter of PDET areas: "18% of respondents said 'the conflict still persists here.'... for just over a million Colombians, of the 6.6 million living in PDET areas, the benefits of peace are still hardly visible" (Nygård et al., 2020). This percentage increased in 2021 to 38.5% (MOE, 2018). In anticipation of the 2022 elections, MOE reported that approximately 58% of the 167 municipalities with Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales para la Paz (all of which are PDET municipalities) faced high electoral risks due to violence. Even though PDET his generally contributed to a reduction of violence, the progress toward peace has been extremely uneven and many communities still face threats.

We expect PDET municipalities to be more supportive of Gustavo Petro in the first and second rounds of the presidential elections, relative to non-PDET municipalities. There are two main reasons that this could be. As explained in the background section above, assignment to the PDET program is not random. Specifically, PDET municipalities have experienced high levels of conflict violence, illicit crops are cultivated there, generally low levels of state capacity and presence and high levels of poverty. It is likely that these highly marginalized communities would exhibit distinct political preferences from voters in less marginalized municipalities. Going back to the debate on the effects of political violence on electoral behavior outlined above, the high levels of historical (and contemporary) violence in the municipalities would likely make PDET municipalities more supportive of a peaceful negotiation to the end of the conflict, independent of the actual implementation of the program.

In Birnir and Gohdes (2018)'s examination of the effect of insurgent violence on the 1990 presidential election in Peru, they distinguish the local and national effects of violent attacks.

At the national level more insurgent violence pushed Peruvian voters away from the incumbent. But at the local level, communities that experienced insurgent violence directly were more likely to punish the political parties that they associated with the insurgency. The responsibility for violence in the Colombian context in the years since the negotiated peace has grown increasingly complex. With the FARC pulled to the negotiating table and then formally demobilized, civil conflict violence did not stop. A range of actors, including FARC splinter groups, other insurgent groups (e.g. the ELN), criminal organizations, paramilitaries and even state security forces have been implicated in the cycle of increasingly targeted violence, especially against environmental activists and community leaders. These victims of violence are often accused falsely of being leftist insurgents. This confusing milieu of violence and falsehoods may in someways reduce voters' perception that violence is perpetrated by Leftist-insurgents, unlinking the fate of the leftist Pacto Histórico coalition from episodes of violence.

Generally, the extremely marginalized (PDET eligible) municipalities in Colombia, have cast pro-peace and leftist votes (Arjona, 2016b; Branton et al., 2019; Gillooly, 2022).[7] Somewhat counter to Birnir and Gohdes (2018)'s argument and findings in Peru, support for pro-peace (in benefit of the FARC) was greater in municipalities where guerrillas were present and more violence occurred (Arjona, 2016b; Fergusson and Molina, 2016). Taken together, this might lead us to expect a generally positive and left-ward effect of violence in the 2022 presidential election, and given the more intense experience of violence in the PDET (eligible) communities, we would expect a much stronger left-effect of violence. Moreover, marginalized communities in the Colombian periphery were bastions of electoral support for leftist parties at the local level, suggesting a political predisposition in these areas to vote left (Steele, 2011). There are valid reasons to expect that *the characteristics of marginalized municipalities that make them eligible for participation in PDET, rather than the actual PDET program, are also responsible for an increase in support for the left in the 2022 presidential elections.* In terms of our analysis, once these controls for PDET characteristics are introduced to the model, we might expect the predicted effect of PDET on left coalition support to be reduced.

It is also possible that the implementation of PDET itself, over and above the characteristics of the municipality, would predict greater support for the Leftist coalition. Voter turnout in presidential elections has been increasing since the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Appendix

[7] Although see Liendo and Braithwaite (2018) for the argument that political orientation rather than conflict experiences determined voters' positions on the peace deal.

Figure 4 shows that both non-PDET municipalities and municipalities that would eventually become PDET, have both seen an increase in turnout over time. Yet comparing the two, PDET municipalities have had a sharper rate of increase in turnout compared to non-PDET. Moreover, the increase in turnout in PDET municipalities has increased more quickly since the signing of the Peace Deal in 2016.

Higher voter turnout tends to benefit parties that are further to the left on the ideological scale (Pacek and Radcliff, 1995). More marginalized voters typically tend to support more left policies and parties at a greater rate compared to less marginalized voters, because their material interests link them to policy proposals on the left (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). As a consequence, they tend to vote for the left at higher rates than voters from less marginalized backgrounds, who tend to vote more often: ''to the extent that [marginalized voters] vote disproportionately for left parties, the left vote should vary directly with the level of turnout."[8] This is not an iron-clad law, that increased turnout boosts left support— studies of turnout in Latin America generally challenge the resources story, because voters with fewer resources (who also tend to be left supporters) often vote at equal or higher rates to wealthier voters (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita, 2014; Fornos et al., 2004). Moreover, several recent studies find that higher turnout does not consistently boost support for the left in all electoral and country contexts (Lutz and Marsh, 2007).

In the context of our analysis of the 2022 elections in Colombia, we argue that the PDET program likely boosted support for the Left in 2022 by reducing the material barriers to turnout in highly marginalized municipalities. The historic creation of 16 new congressional districts (*Curules de Paz* or Peace Seats) through Chapter 2 of the Peace Accords, provide specific representation for the 16 PDET Zones. The first elections for representation for Peace Seats were held concurrently with the Congressional elections on March 13, 2022 providing further incentives to engage and participate in the presidential elections. But more than the paper implementation of PDET, the program design is participatory. It rests on the foundational interests, input and oversight of *los nadies*, the indigenous and Black communities, *campesinos* and women "that permit speaking of everyone, for everyone" (Velazquez and Londoño, 2022, pg.19-20). Especially relative to similarly marginalized municipalities, PDET municipalities should have greater turnout and greater support for the left coalition. The following hypotheses

[8] pg. 138

layout the observable implications of the two possible ways that PDET would predict stronger electoral support for the left.

*Hypothesis*2: PDET municipalities will be more likely to support the leftist coalition compared to non-PDET municipalities.

*Hypothesis*2.1: Left coalition support will be similar in PDET municipalities to non-PDET municipalities with similar characteristics prior to the implementation of PDET (historical violence, coca cultivation, low state capacity, economic vulnerability).[9]

*Hypothesis*2.2: Left coalition support will be greater in PDET municipalities than in non-PDET municipalities with similar characteristics prior to the implementation of PDET (historical violence, coca cultivation, low state capacity, economic vulnerability), as a function of higher turnout in PDET municipalities.

5 Data and Methodology

To assess the impact of peace implementation and conflict violence on vote choice in the Colombian 2022 presidential elections, we utilize municipal-level data, the most micro-level unit of publicly available information. The municipal data provide a rich trove of information regarding the spatial distribution of violence, peace accords implementation, and support for Petro-Márquez. Our dependent variables, *Petro-Márquez Vote-Share Round 1* and *Petro-Márquez Vote-Share Round 2*, are the percentage of support for Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez at the municipal level in the two presidential elections of 2022 (first and second round) These data were collected from the *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil*, the governmental body that implements elections.

Our two key independent variables are municipal-level measures of subversive actions (*Acciones subversivas*) by guerrillas and PDET implementation. *Acciones subversivas* is the sum of the number of military interactions between guerrillas and Public Forces[10] in the municipality from 2003 to 2019; this includes FARC actions, ELN and three small guerrilla groups attacks (ERP, ERG, and EPL). [11] We use a dichotomous variable, *PDET*, that equals 1 if the munic-

[9]These 4 characteristics were the selection criteria for PDET zones, so these are important covariates to consider to identify the marginal effects of its implementation.

[10]The Colombian Ministry of Defense defines subversive actions as "Any action of a military nature that involves armed interaction between guerrilla groups Public Forces" (Toda acción de carácter militar que implique una interacción armada entre grupos guerrilleros y Fuerza Pública.)

[11]We focus on this range of years because the dataset started in 2003 and has not published information after



Figure 2 Plots of Petro-Márquez vote share in the first round across key variables.

ipality is part of the peace program, 0 otherwise. The 170 PDET municipalities are displayed above in Fig. 1. Data on PDET Zones were obtained from *la Agencia de Renovación del Territorio* (The Agency of Territorial Renovation), the governmental body that implements the Peace Accords.

Fig. 2 presents two graphs reflecting the relationship between the support for Petro-Márquez in the first round and the two key independent variables, guerrilla attacks and PDET implementation. The left panel displays the relationship between Vote Share Round 1 and *Acciones subversivas*, while the right panel displays the relationship between Vote Share Round 1 and PDET. Both panels reflect a positive relationship, municipalities with a greater number of guerrilla attacks over the last two decades voted more strongly for Petro-Márquez in the first round. Likewise, PDET municipalities went for Petro-Márquez at a higher rate compared to non-PDET municipalities.

In addition to the primary variables of interest, our models and quasi-experiment include several potentially confounding municipal-level social and economic demographic factors. We use data obtained from a databank hosted by the Economics Department at the *Universidad de Los Andes*[12]. Those control variables include the level of poverty as the average of the index of unsatisfied basic needs (NBI in Spanish), and municipal demographic and natural characteristics, such as a log of municipal population, altitude, average annual rainfall, distance

2019.

[12]The data can be found online at https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co.

to the capital city of the department, all of which condition recruitment and the effectiveness of state policing (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). We also use data culled from the *Departamento Nacional de Planeación* to measure subnational government quality and national government monetary transfers to the local government. Likewise, we control for the number of hectares of coca crops culled from the *Ministerio de Justicia* and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; and previous presidential electoral results from *Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil* and published by the *Misión de Observación Electoral*[13]. We control for the ratio of the slave population in the middle of the XIX century because the historical geography of slavery has continued to predict support for parties, especially to the left of center (Ahmed et al., 2021). Also, in order to control for potential punishment of the incumbent, we control for the rate of deaths due to Covid-19 published by the *Datos Abiertos Colombia*[14]. The definition and main descriptive statistics of the mentioned variables can be seen in the Appendix, Table A1. Finally, department-fixed effects are used to account for unobserved heterogeneity.

We test our hypothesis in three different ways. First, we use an ordinary least squares estimator and control for the factors explained above, which might influence insurgent attacks, policy implementation, and electoral support.[15]. Second, we take advantage of the PDET's policy design to create a propensity score matching (PSM) design. This quasi-experiment allows us to compare the effects of *Acciones subversivas* and PDET on Petro-Márquez vote share in municipalities with similar characteristics before PDET implementation. Through PSM we use these pre-PDET covariates to estimate a maximum likelihood model of the conditional probability that a municipality would be designated to participate in PDET (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Cunningham, 2021). Taking in to account the four main selection criteria for PDET, we utilize four municipal characteristics: high levels of unsatisfied basic needs, *NBI*; average hectares of coca crops from 1998 to 2017, *Coca Crops*; *Acciones subversivas*; and *Local Capacities*, low local administrative and management capabilities. This method for testing causal relationships is commonly used in crime and violent literature in Latin America (see, for example, Hernández (2019) and Gibson et al. (2009)). Finally, using the propensity scores, we simulated a difference-in-difference design to test our mechanism.

[13]The data can be found online at https://www.datoselectorales.org/
[14]The data can be found online at https://www.datos.gov.co/
[15]This method is commonly used in the literature of political violence. See, for example, Weintraub et al. (2015)

6 Results

Table 1 indicates that, in most models, *Acciones subversivas* are not significantly related to Vote Share Round 1 (Model 1 and Model 2) and Vote Share Round 2 (Model 3 and Model 4). Although there is an initial correlation between *Acciones subversivas* and Vote Share Round 1 (Model 1), this relationship decreases in magnitude and significance when we introduce a full set of controls to the model (Model 2). In particular, when PDET is interacted with *Acciones subversivas*, the un-interacted violence measure loses significance and we observe a relatively small, negative relationship between Vote Share Round 1 in PDET municipalities. In other words, we find that conflict violence is unrelated to Petro-Márquez vote-share in non-PDET municipalities and negatively associated with their vote-share in PDET municipalities (though relatively weakly so). However, we only find a significant association between vote share and violence for the first round of the presidential elections. Model 3 and 4 show there is not a significant relationship between *Acciones subversivas* on its own, nor interacted with PDET. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, municipalities that experience more civil conflict violence were not more likely to vote in favor of the leftist coalition candidate.[16]

The results in Table 1 indicate that PDET municipalities have a positive and significant correlation with the vote share for Petro-Marquez, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Importantly, we find a consistent, positive relationship between PDET and Vote Share Round 1 and Round 2, challenging Hypothesis 2.1. Regardless of the specifications and control variables, PDET municipalities are 1.7 to 3.4 percentage-points more likely to support the left-wing coalition, compared to non-PDET municipalities. As discussed above, a comparison of Model 2 and Model 4 shows that violence among PDET municipalities was a determining factor initially, but this negative interactive relationship does not reach statistical significance for Round 2. Fig. 3 provides a substantive interpretation of these results, based on models 2 and 4 in Table 1. The Petro-Márquez vote share increased by an additional 2 points in the first round and 3 points in the second round in PDET municipalities.

The OLS model presented in Table 1 cannot fully rule out Hypothesis 2.1. Despite the robustness of our results with multiple specifications and controls, the PDET program was implemented based on municipal characteristics and these selection criteria, rather than PDET

[16] We also examined non-linear relationships between prior violence and electoral decisions. Table1 reveals that there is no inverted U relationship between these two variables, contrary to the findings of Weintraub et al. (2015).

Table 1 Petro-Márquez vote shares and peace implementation.

.variable	.stat	Model 1 (First round)	Model 2 (First round)	Model 3 (Second round)	Model 4 (Second round)
(Intercept)	Estimate	0.092***	0.090***	0.047	0.045
	Std Err	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.042]	[0.042]
PDET	Estimate	0.017**	0.026***	0.026***	0.034***
	Std Err	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.012]
Acciones subversivas	Estimate	-0.005*	-0.002	-0.005	-0.003
	Std Err	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Acciones subversivas squared	Estimate	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
*Acciones subversivas** PDET	Estimate		-0.009*		-0.007
	Std Err		[0.005]		[0.007]
Petro vote share 2018	Estimate	0.900***	0.900***	0.934***	0.935***
	Std Err	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Department fixed effects		✓	✓	✓	✓
	N	930	930	930	930
	R2	0.951	0.951	0.921	0.921
	adj R2	0.949	0.949	0.918	0.918
	AIC	-3019.338	-3020.235	-2415.757	-2414.648

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001



Figure 3 Marginal effects of key variables on Petro-Márquez victories

itself, may be the true cause of the relationship that we observe. To control for potential selection biases, we employed a propensity score matching (PSM) approach. PSM enables us to quantify the effect of the treatment, in our case the implementation of peace, by matching each PDET municipality ("treated unit" in the language of PSM) with a non-PDET municipality ("un-treated unit") that has similar characteristics, effectively creating an artificial control group (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Cunningham, 2021). Fig. A4 shows the result of a logit model, where the outcome variable is treatment status (PDET) and includes the four covariates: unsatisfied basic needs, the log of hectares of coca crops, number of subversive actions, and an administrative and management capabilities score. The estimated propensity scores by treatment status can be seen in Fig. A4.

In order to match PDET municipalities to non-PDET municipalities with highly similar characteristics (propensity scores, and thus potential for inclusion into PDET), we use nearest-neighbor matching. In this method, a distance is calculated between each treated unit and several control units, and each treated unit is paired with, at least, one control unit (Greifer, 2022). This approach is preferred because it is the most widely used form of matching in the literature (Thoemmes and Kim, 2011).[17]

Once the matching was completed, we analyzed the impact of PDET on Vote Share Round 1 and Vote Share Round 2. Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 2 indicate that PDET had a positive and significant impact on Petro-Márquez's vote share in both the first and run-off rounds. This suggests that being part of the PDET program, a key component of the peace agreement, led to increased support for the left-wing coalition by 1.5 in the first round and 2.4 percentage points in the second round compared to the 2018 election. These findings strongly infirm Hypothesis 2.1, which established that support for the left coalition was similar in PDET municipalities and in non-PDET municipalities with similar pre-implementation characteristics (historical violence, coca cultivation, low state capacity, and economic vulnerability). Instead, our results suggest that the local implementation of PDET provided an electoral boost to the Petro-Márquez coalition.

So far the evidence presented is strongly suggestive of Hypothesis 2.2, but we have not yet

[17]Fig A4 shows the distribution of propensity scores between matched and unmatched units, with a neighbor ratio of five. Additionally, we conducted a Welch Two-Sample t-test for each covariate and compared the treatment and control groups. As seen in Tables A5 and A6, the differences in means between the PDET municipalities group and the artificial control group are smaller after the matching, resulting in a higher degree of balance among the covariates included in the model.

Table 2 The effect of PDET on Petro-Márquez's victory.

Variable	.stat	Model 1 (First round)	Model 2 (Second round)
(Intercept)	Estimate	0.137***	0.093**
	Std Err	[0.032]	[0.044]
PDET	Estimate	0.015**	0.024***
	Std Err	[0.006]	[0.009]
Petro vote share 2018	Estimate	0.885***	0.913***
	Std Err	[0.016]	[0.022]
PSM Covariants		✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓
Department Fixed effects		✓	✓
	N	869	869
	R2	0.953	0.925
	adj R2	0.951	0.922
	AIC	-2824.203	-2258.074
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

established the link between PDET and increased voter turnout—a core part of our argument in this paper. We, therefore, use our propensity score matching to estimate a difference-in-difference (DD) design, with PDET municipalities serving as the treatment group and the control group consisting of their previously matched neighbors in the PSM. Substantively, this allows us to estimate the effect of PDET on turnout by comparing differences in the rate of change in turnout for PDET municipalities between the 2018 and 2022 presidential elections relative to the rate of change in non-PDET municipalities. Using PSM with DD provides a more comprehensive assessment of causality, reducing the potential for bias and increasing the precision of estimates (Stuart et al., 2014).

The results of the 2022 elections, as demonstrated in Table 3 and Fig, 4, indicate an overall increase in voter turnout compared to the 2018 elections. However, the increase was more significant in PDET municipalities compared to their non-PDET matched counterparts. PDET municipalities saw an additional 0.053 percentage point increase in voter turnout in 2022. This supports Hypothesis 2.2 and suggests that Petro-Márquez's support was stronger in PDET municipalities with similar historical characteristics (such as historical violence, coca cultivation, low state capacity, and economic vulnerability) due to higher voter participation. While the ideological leanings of these new voters cannot be determined, the evidence suggests that the positive effect of PDET on turnout largely captures the mobilization of Pacto Historico voters.

Table 3 Difference-in-difference: Effect of PDET on voter turnout.

Variable	.stat	Diff-in-diff
(Intercept)	Estimate	0.314***
	Std Err	[0.004]
After	Estimate	0.176***
	Std Err	[0.013]
PDET	Estimate	-0.128***
	Std Err	[0.010]
After*PDET	Estimate	0.053*
	Std Err	[0.031]
	N	9396
	R2	0.041
	adj R2	0.041
	AIC	7339.531
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Figure 4 Voter turnout in presidential elections.



7 Conclusion

We know from several decades of robust research that violence has been and continues to be a central factor shaping the electoral arena in Colombia. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the 2022 presidential election marked an important shift in the salience and valence of conflict violence. In the past elections, all major parties and candidates took a similar dovish position on the civil conflict. Accordingly, we present evidence in this paper of a weak relationship between high exposure to conflict violence and municipal vote share. We find some evidence that high levels of violence decreased the Petro-Márquez vote share in the first round of the presidential elections, especially in the PDET municipalities most effected by the violence. But, this weak effect in the first-round was counter-balanced by the stronger, positive effect of PDET in the same municipalities. In general, support for the left coalition was quite strong in both rounds of the presidential elections, and we find evidence that PDET had a compounded positive effect on Left support through its positive effect on voter turnout.

We have to be cautious with how we generalize these results. First, the 2022 elections were contextually situated within a highly favorable set of conditions for the left coalition. High levels of frustration with the incumbent right-wing government due to the social and economic burdens of the COVID-19 pandemic and the highly unpopular proposal to reform the pension system and the same government's violent response to the protests provided broad support for an anti-establishment candidate. That the leftist coalition provided a more programmatic and transparent appeal to voters is no doubt an important explanation for the historical victory for the Left over mainstream and right-wing alternatives. However, given the mix of factors that make 2022 so unique, it is unclear whether PDET will continue to have the same directional effect in future elections. Second, the progress of the Peace Agreement and specifically the PDET program has been extremely uneven. Violence still matters to politics in most of the 16 PDET regions. Social leaders in these areas are killed at higher rates and armed groups still occupy territory in some cases. While the participatory structure of the program has provided a key mechanism for mobilizing disadvantaged and previously excluded voters, a failure to systematically address the safety, needs for public services and resources in these areas could lead voters to disengage or even punish the Petro government in future elections. In short, because this paper provides one clear snapshot of the PDET effect, it is unclear whether the

direction and strength of this effect will remain consistent across time. Lastly, future research will need to pay close attention to the micro-level attitudes and political behavior of voters in these areas. Our municipal-level analysis provides rigorous evidence of an effect on vote share and turnout, but more micro-level qualitative and quantitative data is needed to better understand how PDET aligns with political preferences, trust in institutions, and political efficacy. Likewise, it will be important to continue to evaluate whether and how PDET is structurally changing the deep divide between the lived experiences of "*los nadies*" and the chronically included sectors of Colombian society.

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Appendix

Figure A1 Historical *Acciones subversivas* by deciles.



Figure A2 Homicides rate per 100,000 population in PDET and non-PDET municipalities.



Figure A3 Petro-Márquez vote share on the first (left) and second (right) round by deciles.



Table A1 Definitions and descriptive statistics of the main variables

Variable	Description	Descriptive statistics
Acciones subversivas	Number of actions of a military nature that involves armed interaction between guerrilla groups Public Forces in the municipality from 2003 to 2019; this includes four different guerrillas (FARC, ELN, ERP, ERG and EPL).	Min= 0 Max = 107 Mean = 2.42
PDET	PDET 1 if the municipality is part of the PDET program, 0 otherwise	Min=0 Max=1 n=170
Petro-Márquez Vote-Share (Round 1 and Round 2)	Percentage of votes for Gustavo Petro and Francia Márquez at the municipal level in the two presidential elections of 2022 (first and second round)	In the first round, Min = 2.73% Max= 95.18% Mean = 34.74%. For the second round, Min= 3.45% Max= 98.33% Mean = 42.20%
Petro vote share 2018	Percentage of votes for Gustavo Petro at the municipal level in 2018	In the first round of 2018, Min= 1.07% Máx= 88.59%, Mean = 24.35%. For the second round, Min= 2.92% Max= 94.73% Mean = 34.80%
Local capacities	This variable measures the average performance of the management of territorial entities in 2005 and 2017, based on: the results obtained, the commitments made by these entities in development plans, the framework of the decentralization of competencies and resources process, and compliance with the legal framework that underpins it.	Min =28.17 Max=82.02 Mean = 62.69

Variable	Description	Descriptive statistics
NBI	Average of the index of unsatisfied basic needs at the municipality level between 1993, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2018.	Min= 11.01 Max= 100 Mean = 46.73
Coca crops	The average number of hectares of coca crops in a given municipality between 1998-2018	Min= 0 Max=118676.4 Mean = 1598.26
Slave ratio	The ratio of the slave population in the middle of the XIX century collected by \cite{Ahmed2021}	Min= -0.32 Max=9.77 Mean = 0
Rainfall	Average annual rainfall by millimetre at the municipal level	Min = 160 Max =9200 Mean =1914
Distance to capital	Linear distance to the capital of the department in kilometers.	Min 0 Max =360.77 Mean = 80.38
Altitute	Height of the municipality - MSL (Meters Above Sea Level)	Min = 2 Max= 25221 Mean=1110
Population	Log of the total population	Min 6.82 Máx=14.57 Mean 9.47
Covid death rate	Number of Covid-19 deaths as a proportion of the total population by December 2021.	Min 0 Max=0.765 Mean =0.154

Table A2 First round determinants of Petro-Márquez vote share.

Variable	.stat	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	Estimate	0.308***	0.293***	0.080***	0.092***	0.090***
	Std Err	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.030]	[0.030]
PDET	Estimate	0.227***	0.177***	0.038***	0.017**	0.026***
	Std Err	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.012]	[0.006]	[0.009]
log(*Acciones subversivas* + 1)	Estimate		0.038***	0.012***	-0.005*	-0.002
	Std Err		[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Acciones subversivas squared	Estimate			-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err			[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Petro vote share 2018	Estimate			1.085***	0.900***	0.900***
	Std Err			[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.016]
log(*Acciones subversivas* + 1) * PDET	Estimate			-0.029***		-0.009*
	Std Err			[0.007]		[0.005]
Incumbent coalition	Estimate				-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err				[0.005]	[0.005]
Local capacities	Estimate				-0.001	-0.001
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Coca crops	Estimate				0.000	0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
NBI	Estimate				-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Slave ratio	Estimate				0.008***	0.008***
	Std Err				[0.002]	[0.002]
Rainfall	Estimate				0.000	0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to capital	Estimate				-0.000***	-0.000***
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Altitute	Estimate				-0.000**	-0.000**
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
log(Population)	Estimate				0.008***	0.008***
	Std Err				[0.003]	[0.003]
Covid death rate	Estimate				7.670***	7.683***
	Std Err				[2.203]	[2.201]
Department fixed effects		No	No	No	Yes	Yes
	N	1108	1108	1108	930	930
	R2	0.146	0.164	0.865	0.951	0.951
	adj R2	0.145	0.163	0.865	0.949	0.949
	AIC	-428.628	-451.185	-2468.317	-3019.338	-3020.235
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

Table A3 Second round determinants of Petro-Márquez vote share.

Variable	.stat	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
(Intercept)	Estimate	0.379***	0.364***	0.141***	0.047	0.045
	Std Err	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.042]	[0.042]
PDET	Estimate	0.241***	0.191***	0.044***	0.026***	0.034***
	Std Err	[0.018]	[0.021]	[0.015]	[0.009]	[0.012]
log(*Acciones subversivas* + 1)	Estimate		0.039***	0.011**	-0.005	-0.003
	Std Err		[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Acciones subversivas squared	Estimate			-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err			[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Petro vote share 2018	Estimate			1.134***	0.934***	0.935***
	Std Err			[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.022]
log(*Acciones subversivas* + 1) * PDET	Estimate			-0.029***		-0.007
	Std Err			[0.009]		[0.007]
Incumbent coalition	Estimate				0.008	0.008
	Std Err				[0.006]	[0.006]
Local capacities	Estimate				-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Coca crops	Estimate				0.000	0.000*
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
NBI	Estimate				-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Slave ratio	Estimate				0.008***	0.008***
	Std Err				[0.003]	[0.003]
Rainfall	Estimate				-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Distance to capital	Estimate				-0.000***	-0.000***
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
Altitute	Estimate				-0.000	-0.000
	Std Err				[0.000]	[0.000]
log(Population)	Estimate				0.017***	0.017***
	Std Err				[0.003]	[0.003]
Covid death rate	Estimate				9.555***	9.565***
	Std Err				[3.048]	[3.048]
Department fixed effects	Estimate	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
	N	1108	1108	1108	930	930
	R2	0.140	0.157	0.810	0.921	0.921
	adj R2	0.140	0.155	0.809	0.918	0.918
	AIC	-244.178	-263.662	-1908.269	-2415.757	-2414.648
Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				

Table A4 Covariants of the probability to be choosen as a PDET.

Variable	Stat	PSM
(Intercept)	Estimate	-1.798*
	Std Err	[1.044]
Acciones subversivas	Estimate	0.137***
	Std Err	[0.023]
Local capacities	Estimate	-0.042***
	Std Err	[0.014]
Log(Coca crops)	Estimate	0.360***
	Std Err	[0.034]
NBI	Estimate	0.023***
	Std Err	[0.007]
	N	1108
	AIC	532.303
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Figure A4 Estimated propensity scores by treatment status.



Figure A5 Distribution of matched and unmatched units



Table A5 .Welch Two Sample t-test between treatment (PDET) and control group on covariants before the matching.

Covariant	**t-value**	**df**	**P-value**	**95% Confidence interval**	**Mean Control**	**Mean Treatment**
Acciones subversivas	-7.6979	173.07	1.014e-12	-11.463524 ; -6.784637	1.061966	10.186047
Local Capacities	9.8815	265.43	2.2e-16	5.571237 ; 8.343899	64.79386	57.83629
Coca crops	-6.5905	172.02	5.153e-10	-10935.382 ; -5894.769	181.6868	8596.7623
NBI	-12.263	235.95	2.2e-16	-22.61125 ; -16.35197	41.67730	61.15891

Table A6 .Welch Two Sample t-test between treatment and control group on covariants after the matching.

Covariant	**t-value**	**df**	**P-value**	**95% Confidence interval**	**Mean Control**	**Mean Treatment**
Acciones subversivas	-7.6305	173.42	1.49e-12	-11.389451 ; -6.708224	1.137209	10.186047
Local Capacities	8.2884	262.61	5.973e-15	4.438078 ; 7.203791	63.65723	57.83629
Coca crops	-6.5754	172.22	5.153e-10	-10935.382 ; -5894.769	181.6868	8596.7623
NBI	-10.911	234.97	2.2e-16	-20.44356 ; -14.19005	43.84210	61.15891